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In this paper, we argue that there is more to be learned from recent research on the
effectiveness of targeted saving incentives than is suggested by the wide variation in empirical
estimates. First, we conclude that characterizations of “all new saving” or “no new saving” are
extreme; IRAs and401 (k) plans appear to stimulate moderate amounts of new saving. Second, we
suggest a cost-benefit approach to ask: What is the incremental gain in capital accumulation per
dollar of foregone revenue? We find that for quite conservative measures of the saving impacts of
IRAs or 401 (k)s, the incremental gains in capital accumulation per dollar of lost revenue are large.
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and NBERThe past two decades have witnessed the introduction of a n@er of ptilic
~licies designed to provide incentives for hous~old saving. Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs)were first permittd in 1974 to provide a tax-
preferred saving program for employees without pension plans. The tax
advantage was the ability to defer paying taxes on tie “pension” contribution
until the assets were withdrawn at retirement. Espite the fact that half of
all workers were eligible to contribute (becausethey had no pension plan at
that time), fewer than one percent of taxpayers contributed.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 expanded IRA eligibility to allow
virtually all working taxpayers to contribute, and IRA limits were increased.
In one year, IW contributions rose from $5 billion to $28 billion. Gver “Je
1982-1986 pericd, households contributedmre than $170 billion to IRA
accounts; by 1986, IW contributionswere abcut one–fifth of aggregate
personal saving. The Tax Refom Act of 1986, however, excluded higher–income
taxpayers with qloyer-provided pensions from making tax-deductible
contributions. Total tax-deducttile contributions fell by 62 percent in 1987,
and have r~ined low since then.
Another targeted saving program, the 401(k) plan, has become prominent in
recent years. ;fiile401(k) plans became available since 1978, it was only
after the Bparment of the Treasury clarified rules for their use in 1981
that ‘Aey attracted substantial interest. Like traditional 1-, 401(k) plans
involve tax-ceducribie contributions, no taxes paid on acmulated interest
until the fun~ are withdraw, limits on annual contributions, and
1restrictions on early withdrawals.
plan is available only to qloyees
such plans. ~loyee contributions
There are differences, however. A 401(k)
of organizations tiat elect to s~nsor
to a 401(k) ocu through regular payroll
deductions, whereas IRA contributionsmy be made at the qloyee’s
discretion. Finally, qloyers can (andoften do) supplment qloyee
contribution rates to a 401(k).
A recent out~uring of research
401(k) plans in stimulating saving.
significant ~sitive effects of I-
Hubbardf 1984; Venti and Wise, 1986,
has analyzed the effectiveness of I= and
Some researchers have found large and
and 401ks on saving behavior (see
1987, 1988, 1991; and Poterba, Venti, and
Wise, 1994, 1995); the evidence favoring this view is marshaled in Poterba,
Venti, and Wise (1996) in this s-sim.l Others examine the same data and
find little or no saving effects of 401(k)s and I=, as in the Engen, Gale,
and Scholz (1996) contribution to this s=sim.
revisit the tangled dbate over the effectiveness
In this paper, we first
of saving incentives, and
suggest there is gd reason to believe that the truth lies somewhere between
tie extremes of “no new saving” and “all new saving.”
More fundamentally, even if one could broker an agreaent among tie
warring factions on the ma@tude of how IW and 401(k) contributions affect
personal saving, further questions need to be answered. Suppcse, for exmple,
one settles on an intermediate esttite tiat 26 cents of every dollar ir,1~
contributions represents new saving. ~es this mean that IRAs are a rousing
success? A corrrplete faillxe? One cannot answer this question without knowing
something *ut the cost of tie program, in tem of foregone tax revenue. We
2develop a cost-benefit approach which focuses on the incremental gain in
long-term capital acmulation per dollar of foregone government revenue from
offering the savings incentive program. For even ~ite conservative measures
of the saving effects of IRAs or 401ks, this approach estimates that the
incremental gains in capital accumulation per dollar of lost revenue are
generally large.
Finally, even cost-benefit analysis of this sort does not allow one to
judge whetier saving incentives are a success, which we mean an irrtprovement in
welfare. To mke this judgment, one must first isolate ~tential market
failures that cause people to save too little in the first place. Gne than
can assess whether such failures are sufficiently serious to justify the cost
of targeted saving programs. We consider economic arguments that tight
justify having targeted saving incentives in the first place-- like social
benefits from increasing the size of the capital stock, relaxing the
intert-rai distortion of cons~tion and saving decisions made by
households, or @roving the financial health of households to reduce the
govement’s cost of welfare spending for @verished elderly. While it is
difficult to attach a precise estkte to the value of overcoming these
ptential mrket failures is difficult, the mst compelling rationale for
saving incentives, in our judgent, is that such incentives help to overcome
what appears to be inade~ate financial planning for retiraent.Individual Wti ~t hu.n=: What Do We Know’?
Households who contribute to IP.Aaccounts tend to be wealthier, older, and
have higher incomes than those who do not. A detailed pictwe of the typical
1~ contributor, based on 20,000 observations from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, canbe taken from Venti and Wise (1991). In 1985, for
ex~le, four percent of households with incomes less than $20,000 and witi
household heads between the ages of 25 and 34 enrolled in 1-. Holding
income constant at less than $20,000, this fraction rises to 18 percent among
those between the ages of 55 and 64. Holding age constant, IP,Acontributions
rise dramatically with income. For exarrrple, among those age 55-64 and with
income of $20,000 to $40,000, contribution rates were 50 percent (compared to
18 percent for those with income less than $20,000, as noted tive); for
people of the same age with income over $40,000, contribution rates were Wve
70 percent. Contributors also tend to hold mre wealth than noncontributory.
In 1983, at the outset of the 1~ program, median non-I~ wealth of
contributors (age 65 and younger) was $13,500 (Venti and Wise, 1992). By
1986, media non-I~weal~ of contributors had risen to $21,695 (Gale and
Scholz, 1994), largely because IRA contributors also tend to save more in non-
1~ assets.: By contrast, the median noncontributory held only $3,000 in
liquid assets. IRA contributors clearly have a greater taste for saving than
noncontributory.
4Indiviti Wti ~t munts ~ Ho@old ~ving : ~=ry
Much of the analysis by economists of households’ cons~tion and saving
decisions is conducted using versions of the life-cycle model. In its mst
basic form, the model implies that households save during their working lives
to finance retirement cons~tion. The pattern of saving over an individual’s
lifetime depends on the rate of return to saving, that individual’s





The current generation of life-cycle mdels adds two feat~es to
approach: imperfect markets for lending, so that households face
their ability to brrow against future resources to finance current
and @erfect markets for insurance, so that uncertainty over, inter
alia, future length of life, earnings, or medical expenses, can generate
“precautionary saving” by households.3
In the context of the life–cycle mdel, a savings incentive like an IR4 or
a 401(k) plan raises the rate of return for saving done through the mechanism
of tiat account or plan. However, econotic tieory teaches that the incentive
raises a household’s total saving only if the higher rate of ret~ affects
the household at the mrgin -- that is, for an incremental dollar of saving.
Roughly three-fourths of all contributors in any given year depsit the full
IR4 limit in tieir account. Several corrunentators have used this fact as prti
facie evidence that IW could not generate new saving, because they offer no
marginal ir,c~ntiveto save after the limit is reached (see, for exan-tple,
B~, Cordes, and Ozanne, 1990; and Gravelly, 1991).
5But this conclusion is too quick. ~ analysis of cons~tion (and saving)
decisions over a lifetime requires a focus on lifetime limits, not annual
ltits . From a lifetime perspective, the relevant limit on 1~ contributions
is not the annual limit of, say, $2,000 or $4,000, but the lifetime ltit.~
Gale and Scholz (1994)d~nstrated that only 30 percent of 1~ contributors
contribute at the limit for each of three years, implying that the remaining
70 percent of 1~ contributors faced a mrginal incentive in at least one of
the three years. This evidence suggests that the IRA lfits are binding for
few households, even in the relatively short term. Raember, even if no
contributions are made during the interveningyear, the IRA provides a
marginal, if unused, incentives
Some economists eschew the ass~tions of life–cycle mdel, and focus
instead on psychological issues of self-control and myopic cons~tion
behavior (Thaler, 1994). This focus suggests tiat households are not
optimizing life–cycle agats, respnding to marginal saving incentives as &.e>-
mke lifetime cons~tion and retirement plans. Instead, they are myopic
decisionmakers who have trouble saving for retirement and who res~nd to
programs that encourage self control in setting aside assets future
cons~tion. In this view, IRAs and 401(k)s mtivate saving bth because of
the tiediate reward of the tax deduction (includingthe pleasure of denying
the IRS its due) and the fact that money is placed “off limits” for current
consqtion. There is some evidence consistent with this view. For ex~le,
taxpayers are far more likely to contribute to an IRA if they owed money to
the IRS in excess of taxes withheld (Feenbergand Skinner, 1989). Apparently,
6taxpayers would rather write a tineckfor $2,000 to an 1~ tian a heck for
$800 to the IRS.’ Similarly, the life-cycle@el predicts that optimizing
agents should contribute early in tie year to their 1~ to maximize t=
benefits. However, roughly 40 percent of IRA contributors during tie 1984 tax
year filed quite late, actually in calendar year 1985 (Statisticsof Income,
1984).7
Dth the life-cycle and the behavioral saving tiels suggest that 1~
and 401(k)s have at least the ptential to promte saving even in the short
term. However, the magnitude of such an effect can only be detetined by
linking at qirical evidence.
Individual wti~t ~ m ti Ho*old Saving: Evib=
Asessing how much I- affect saving in tie short term is more difficult
than it might first appear. A complete analysis would require a significant
munt of information -ut households: their taxable assets and tax-favored
assets, along with earnings, age, and demographic characteristics like marital
status or ntier of children ‘&at affect consqtion and saving decisions.
Households are also likely to have different underlying preferences for saving
that are not observable. me means of controlling for different household
preferences is to use panel &ta on the same households over time, thus
tracking partialar househol&, but even this approach will not help if
preferences tiut saving vary over time. Some of the differing opinions of
savings incentives-–and the tiiguities in results–-reflect data ltitationsthat have constrained the ways in which economists have been able to examine
effects of saving incentives on household saving.
Before delving into econometric issues, it is useful to consider what
people say when asked but how they funded their 1~ contributions. In a
1983 survey of 1~ contributors, Johnson (1985) found that: “hut half of the
respondents said they would have saved it an~ay. hut 10 percent said they
would have spent it all, while but 40 percent said they would have spent
some and saved some.” He estimated that of the $32 billion in 1~
contributions in 1983, $10 billion co~rised new saving, or 31 cents per
dollar of IM contribution. Of course, economists are trained to treat sud.
survey evidence with skepticism unless supprted by structural or econometric
studies. While the range of econometric estimates of effects of IRAs on
saving is broad, we argue below that the qirical evidence is roughly
consistent with this survey data.
At the high end of the range of effects are the results of Venti and Wise
(1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991). They tiel the choice among three qti:
cons~tion, tax-favored (IRA) saving, and taxable (liquid) saving. They
reason that if IRA saving is a perfect substitute for taxable saving, ther.hk.e
individual will Mediately shift taxable saving into I-, because IRAs of~ec
the higher net-of-tax rate of return. If, however, 1~ are imperfect
substitutes, for oti.erfom of saving, then some IRA contributions will ccr.e
not at the expense of taxable saving, but at the expense of current
consqtion. In this case, 1~ contributions represent new saving. In
evidence from a series of papers, Venti and Wise estimate that 45–66 percenr
8of the increase in 1~ contributions comes at the expense of current
cons~tion, while hut 30 percent comes from the tax subsidy, and between 3
and 20 percent comes from a reshuffling of existing saving. (Note that we
subtract the tax break –– the 30 percent tive -– in assessing what part of
the IRA is new saving. Hence our reprted net saving effect could be -30
percent–-for ex~le, if the individual funded 70 percent or the IRA with
shuffled saving, and spent the remaining 30 percent from the reduction in tax
liability.)
my might 1~ and non-IF.Asaving be ~rfect substitutes? Gale and
Scholz (1994)make an @rtant advance by focusing explicitly on the
illiquidity of 1~ balances. A household may be concerned that, at some
futme pint, its savings will be locked up in an IRA when the funds are
needed, perhaps to respnd to a a medical mergency or a decline in future
income. The earlier approach of Venti and Wise implicitly treats hth saving
and consqtion as “goods.” By contrast, in the approach of Gale and S&olz,
saving 1s not an end in itself, but a means to tie end of future con.s~tion.
To sort out the explanations for the observed relationships among 1~
contributions and savings, Gale and Scholz (1994)derive the @lied saving
function for a particular set of household preferences, where saving is a
function of wealth and age. Their ~el is also more general than ti.atof
Venti and Iiiseby allowing for a difference in tastes saving by 1~
contributors compared to noncontributory. Gale and Scholz compare saving
behavior of contributors who are at the IRA limit with contributors who are
not at the limit –- assuming that bcth groups have a comn tasted for savings
9-- to identify the effect of changes in the 1~ contribution ltit on national
saving. Their estfites show that IRAs have a negative, or at best, zero
effect on saving for tie sqle as a whole. These results suggest that 1~
contributions come ahst entirely from saving that would have been done in
the absence of any incentives.
What’s going on here? The intuition behind the Venti and Wise result is
that My households, even those with very high income, do not contribute to
I-. According to the logic of the Venti-Wise mdel, if IRAs and taxable
saving were perfect substitutes, then everyone should contribute. However,
even among high–income households, roughly one–fourth do not contribute.
Hence 1~ must be @erfect substitutes for non–IRA saving, whiti -lies
that 1~ contributions are coming from reducing current cons~tion and
increasing overall savings. However, in the Gale and Scholz approach, the
fact that some househol& do not contribute to I- is interpreted as evidence
that those households have little or no taste for saving. If so, then (as
Gale and Scholz suggest) the Venti and Wise results my be biased upward. IW.
contributors save more not because of the existence of an IR4 prograrr,, but
because they like to save, in bth IP.Aand non-I~ vehicles.
In contrast, the Gale and Scholz (1994)estimates that IRAs have no irrpact
on saving are probably biased downward, given the extreme fragility of their
result. In “he Gale and Scholz estfites, they aclude households who
re~rted more (in absolute value) than $100,000 in saving. Using this same
exclusion criterion, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996)reprogrammed the Gale and
Scholz econometric model, and ticked tie Gale and Scholz benchmark result
10that I- have zero (or negative) effects on total saving for this same
$100,000 ~clusion rule. However, when Poterba, Venti, and Wise reduced the
exclusion limit to $90,000, or increased it to $110,000, thereby adding or
subtracting just a few observations, the estimated coefficient flipped around
-- in kth cases –– @lying that 1~ were atirely new saving.
Because there are so my probl~ with estimating specific models of IP.A
contributions, a ntier of authors have turned to longitudinal studies of
saving behavior, using repeated sqles over a ntier of years to assess the
extent to which households “reshuffle” existing saving into IP.As. The basic
idea is to use saving and 1~ inforrration on the same (or similar) households
over time. In one such study, Feenberg and Skinner (1989)used the
IRS/University of Michigan longitudinal survey of taxpayers over the period
from 1980 through 1984. They found that, even after controlling for initiai
assets in 1980-81, taxpayers who contributed to 1~ also saved substantially
mre in non–IRA assets. While this evidence weighs against the simplest
story of shuffled saving between taxable balances and 1~ balances, it car~not
be interpreted as proof that I- generate new saving. One cannot control fo~
all pssible reasons leadng to a change in the taste for saving. If a
household decided to increase its overall saving because of mending
retirement, for ex~le, it tight be expected to do so in a variety of
investments including IP.As,even if 1~ have no independent effect on their
tastes or saving choices.
In a different test of the h~thesis that IRA contributions represent new
saving, Joines and Manegold (1995)co~are assets and income of new 1~
11contributors with those who purchased 1~ before the expansion of eligibility
in 1982, also using the IRS/Universityof Michigan taxpayer panel. The thrust
of the Joines–Manegold test is the following: If IRA contributions are new
saving, then new contributors in 1982 should increase tieir saving by mre
than continuing contributors. They find that the marginal effects on saving of
increasing the ltit on IRA contributionsby one dollar are 26 cents or 29
cents of new saving. In addressing a slightly different question, they find
that 19 cents to 26 cents out of each dollar of the typical IRA contribution
is financed by new saving. Their confidence intervals, however, are wider––
between -16 cents to 54 cents in the first case, and -8 cents to 60 cents in
the second. “
In another recent salvo on this subject, Attanasio and E Leire (1994)
compare saving behavior of households just opening an IRA (“new” contributors)
with that of households previously making contributions (“old” contrtiutors).
Their approach is therefore stilar in spirit to Manegold and Joines –– in
that they co~are only new IRA contributorswith old IRA contributors -- but
they have mre coqlete data on both changes in assets and changes in
cons~tion for the two groups. Using data from Consmer Expenditure Survey,
they test to see whetier newly contributinghouseholds decrease their non-1~
assets or their cons~tion to fund contributions.They find that new
contributors do not have slower cons~tion growth, but do experience slower
gro~ti of non-IRA assets, whiti they interpret as sup~rting tie claim that
1~ contributions largely represent reshuffld, not new, saving.
12However, this interpretation evaluates evaluating only the reshuffling
that takes place in the first year for a “neti contributor. Even if one
assumes that nearly all 1~ contributionsby new contributors are shuffled,
one still finds tiat the old contributors –- in the steady state, the vast
majority of all contributors –– are barely shuffling at all. When we
reinterpreted the Attanasio and D Leire results in this light, we found as
much as 49 cents of new saving per $1 contribution to an IF.Aaccount (Hubbard
and Skinner, 1995).
We have argued that the econometric studies finding very large saving
effects are probably biased upward, and the econometric studies finding very
small or negative saving effects are probably biased downward. Cotiined witi.
survey data and other studies suggesting an intermediate impact of I- on
saving, we believe that a conservative estimate of the effect of I- on
personal saving would be hut 26 cents per dollar of IRA contribution.”
401k Plans: What Do We fiow?
Enrollees in 401(k) savings plans lcok muti different from 1~
contributors. Rrrployeeswith low levels of income are far more likely to
participate in a 401k saving plan (when their qloyer offers su~. a plan),
then they are to have an IRA. ~ng workers eligible for a 401(k) plan making
between $15,000 and $20,000 annually in 1993, the participation rate was 55
percent, rising to 83 percent for workers eamingmre than $50,000. ~ng
younger workers at fim with 401(k)s, contribution rates in 1993 were 55
13percent for 21-30 year-olds, rising to 67 percent for 31-40 year-olds, and
over 70 percent for older groups to age 65 (Yakohski, 1993). In other words,
the participation rate for 401(k)s is far higher, especially mng low-income
workers and younger workers, than was the participation rate for IRAs.
Esttiting how 401(k) plans affect household saving should be easier tian
it has proven for IP..As. Individualswho contribute to I- are likely to be
more favorably dispcsed toward saving than those who do not contribute, which
makes the task of distinguishing the mrginal effect of IRAs on saving
difficult. By contrast, some firms offer 401(k) plans to qloyees, and others
do not. It is more appealing to assert that two different groups -- those who
are eligible for 401(k)s and tiose who are not eligible -– are households that
share cortunon characteristics, the saving behavior of workers eligible and not
eligible for 401(k)s.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994)co~are the saving khavior of workers
eligible and not eligible for 401(k)s. They include in their s~le the wy
workers who are eligible to contribute to a 401(k) plan, but choose not to CO
so, to avoid the criticism that individuals who choose to contribute to
401(k)s were eager savers anyway. Gne finding illustrates the flavor of their
results: In 1984, median financial assets excluding 401(k) and 1~. balances,
for those households earning in the $40,000 to $50,000 income range, were
roughly the same for the two groups. Those assets remained generally Unti.anged
between 1984 ad 1991, Between 1987 and 1991, however, median financial
wealti of tiose eligible for 401(k) plans rose drmtically, largely because
of ~Ol(k) contributions. (Unfortmately, no infomtion is avail~le in the
14Poterba-Venti-Wise data for 1984 on 401(k) balances.) Assting that the two
groups -- 401(k)-eligibleand 401(k)-ineligiblehouseholds with equal incomes
-- hold stilar tastes toward saving, and assting the co~sition of these
workers did not change by much between 1987 and 1991, one might conclude that
401(k)s are entirely new saving.
One pssible problem with this conclusion is
defined benefit pension plans with 401(k) plans,
tiat, if firms replace
workers may show an increase
in assets without any effects on overall (pensionplus individual) saving.
The actual munt of such substitution is likely to be =11, however. Papke
(1995) estimates that there is a~st no substitution of 401(k) for defined
contribution plans ~ng large fire, but that mng smaller firms, the
introduction of a 401(k) plan increases the probability of a termination of a
defined benefit pension
small fim account for
plans.
plan by tiut 9 percentage pints. However, such
fewer than one-fourth of all ~loyees with 401(k)
~ additional difficulty witi tie Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994)
co~arisons is that ‘be 1984 survey data do not include information tiut
existing 401(k) plans. ~gen, Gale, md Scholz (1996) for ex~le argue that
many of these early 401(k) plans were s@ly converted from taxable thrift
plans organized prior to 1981, but shifted into 401(k)s to take advantage of
their tax-preferred status. Hence the apparent rise in wealth affect 401(i:)-
eligible househol& ‘between1984 and 1987 could be illusory, (Thispint does
not affect comparisons between 1987 and 1991, of course.) Gne problem with
assessing this bias is that while we bow tiat a large fraction of 401(k)
15plans were converted from thrift plans (Engen,Gale, and Scholz, 1996), we
know nothing ~ut the size of tie balances shifted.
A third difficulty is that firms whose qloyees are eager savers might
also be the ones most likely to @laent a 401(k) plan. Then workers
eligible for 401(k) plans would be systatically different from those not
eligible, a pint stressed by Engen and Gale (1995)and by and Engen, Gale,
and Stiolz (1996). This h~thesis is very hard to test because one cannot
co~are saving behavior of the two groups after the 401(k) plans have been
@lemated, since such co~arisons would be contaminated by the “treatment”
of having offered the 401(k). The likelihood of this “self selection” of
401(k)s by ~loyees who are eager savers is plausible for small firms, though
unlikely for workers at very large firms.
A fouti problem is the “dilution” effect of comparing 401(k) contributors
and noncontributory over time. For example, suppse that there are “eager”
savers and “causal” savers in the ppulation. The earliest participants in
401(k) plans are likely to be the eager savers, so tiat in 1987, a high
proprtion of 401(k) participants would be eager savers. By 1991, however,
causal savers would account for a larger fraction of 401(k) participants
(Bernheim,1994b). In otier words, given the expansion of 401(k) accounts
between 1984 and 1991, the typical 401(k) contributor by 1991 my be less
inclined toward saving tian the typical contributor circa 1984, so the PO1 of
savers is “dilutd.” For example, Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) found a
decline in total financial wealth among 401(k) contributors between 1987 and
1991; they interpret ‘his to mean that 401(k) contributions were entirely
16offset by declines in otier aspects of financial wealth. A more likely
explanation, however, is that the P1 of 401(k) contributors became diluted
during this perid. The fraction of 401(k) contributors who also have an 1~
account –– a rough
percent in 1987 to
Poterba, Venti,
when the sarriple is
1987 and those who
indicator of a prior taste for saving -- declined from 48
37 percent in 1991.
and Wise (1996a)and ~gen and Gale (1995)bth find that,
separated into two groups-–those who had an 1~ account in
did
401(k) contributors in
of cowse, that 401(k)
not––there was an increase in financial assets among
each group.l”
contributions
This latter co~arison does not prove,
increase net wealth, because other
aspects of dilution may be biasing these co~arisons (seeBernheim, 1996).
Econometric estimates of how 401(k)s affect saving behavior are bedeviled by
tie same problem encountered in the IM researchs--the difficulty in
controlling for unobsemable tastes for saving in the ppulation.
Fifth, recent research by Engen and Gale (1995) suggests a different path
by which 401k assets could be shuffled
Their results suggest that the rise in
rratd,ednearly dollar for dollar by an
that people with 401(k) plans are much
line of credit. In fact, developments
-- through home equity lines of cretit.
401k contributions since 1987 have been
increase in home equity debt, implying
more likely to
in tie banking
use their home equity
industry have made it
increasingly easy to tap into
has been criticized, first by
percentage of 401(k)-eligible
home equity. However, the Engen-Gale finding
Bernheim (1996)on a priori groun& that tfie
households with home equity lines of credit (or
whc hught a house) is too -11 to give rise to the very large extent of the
17housing equity offset. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996)offer an empirical
criticism ; they find no difference in the ~rcentage changes in housing
equity between the two groups.:~
Overall, the evidence supprts the view that 401(k) balances have not been
offset by a demulation of financial assets such as stocks, hnds, and
checking accounts. Whether 401(k) contributions
home equity is, however, still an open question.
is that 401(k)s largely represent new saving, if
little in the fom of other financial assets, or
are offset by decreases in
Our reading of the evidence
only because there is so
home equity among low income
and younger 401(k) contributors. We nonetheless recognize that the precise
fraction of 401(k)s representing new saving is still under debate.
A ~st-~it~rcach b Saving In~tives
Even if targeted saving incatives have only moderate effects on
puzzle remain. Suppse that a particular saving incentive generates
cents of new saving per dollar of contribution
successful program? The correct answer is: It
program loses only one cent of tax revenue per
the answer might well be yes -- after all, the
in new saving per one dollar in revenue cost.
to the savings plan.





dollar of contribution, then
~licy results in fom dollars




A Private Capital Accumulation per $1 IRA
A Net Tax Revenue per $1 IRA 1
18Bth the nmerator and denominator are stocks rather than flows, and are
defined for a particular time period after the initial IRA contribution. For
exqle, suppse that the taxpayer is in the 36 percent tax bracket, and that
26 cents of the 1~ contribution represents new saving, as estimated by Joines
and Manegold (1995). Recall that the 26 cents of new saving is in addtion to
the 36 cent tax break which is also depsited in the IRA.:Z The growth in
net capital acmulation in the equation tive would therefore be 62 cents (36
cents saved through reduced tax liability plus 26 cents of new saving),
divided by the revenue loss of 36 cents. The benefit-cost ratio for the first
year after the IRA contribution is therefore 62/36, or 1.72. In other words,
there is an increase in private saving of $1.72 per $1 loss in government
revenue. If the 1~ program were financed through deficit spending, the net
impact of the IRA on capital accumulation in the first year would be $0.72 per
dollar of revenue loss--or the increase in private saving ($1.72) less the
increase in government debt ($1.00) .
However, the benefit-cost ratio in just the first year is rnisleadng. IR~s
lose additional revenue over time, because taxes are pst~ned on fur.dsthat
would have been saved in taxable fore, but IRAs tien generate revenue when
funds are withdrawn. In calculating the benefit-cost ratio, we therefore foc~s
on the change in the stcck of private wealth accumulate over the period for
whiti the II?Ais held, divided by the accumulated tax revenue loss over the
same period.
19Such calmlations require ass~tions tiut interest rates, tax rates, the
length of time for which the 1~ is held, and the tax treatient of the saving
had it been saved in a taxable form. Because most of the esttites from
existing studies are based on data from the 1982–1986 ~riod, we use the tax
regime for that period in our benchmark calculations.We assne a holding
period of 22 years--which corres~nds to buying the IRA at age 50, and cashing
it out at age 72i3-–foran initial marginal tax rate of 36 percent (Joines and
Manegold, 1995), a final retiraent tax rate of 28 percent, an average tax
rate on interest and dividend income of 32 percent, and a 60 percent exclusion
for capital gains. The representativeportfolio, whether invested in an IRA
or taxable assets, is assmed to be 29 percent in equity initially, with the
rminder in a combination of long-term and short–tern hn& an aggregate
~rtfolio consistent with 1985 data (~RI, 1994).’4 During the period from
1900 to 1990, the gmmetric mean of the nominal return in the stock market was
9.35 percent, and the gmmetric mean of a portfolio with one-half short–tern
knds and one-half long-term hnds was 4.0 percent (Siegel, 1992).
Assur@ptionstiut the discount rate used for government debt are crucial
in these evaluations; if we use the low yield on government debt during this
period, saving incentives exhibit very large (or even self-financing) effects
on capital acmulation, largely because of the arbitrage that ocoxs when ~he
govement can hrrow at a low rate of interest, but tax the higher equity
returns of tie IM or 401(k) investors.l~ Instead, we use a higher nominal
discount rate for government d&t of 5.55 percent; this corresponds more
20closely to the historical returns on stocks and
percent share of equity and 71 percent share of
Table 1 presents calculations of our measure
capital acmulation per dollar of foregone tax
hnds noted tive, with a 29
knds.
of the additional private
revenue, for a wide range of
e~tfites. The first row in Table 1 shows how the marginal @act of IR4s on
capital accumulation depends on ass~tions but
contributions that are new saving. When there is
contribution –– in other words, 64 percent of the
saving, and 36 percent funded by the reduction in




that the 1~ is d~t-financed, the net









national capital stock would
cents (22 cent increase in private saving, one dollar reduction in
saving). At a corrrpromise estimate of 26 cents in
suggested by Joines and Manegold (1995),the -lied increase




Thus, even for a deficit-financed IRA, the net capital stock increases by
$1.21. A relatively tiest saving effect of IRAs can translate into a
substantial “bang for the buck” in terms of capital growth ~r dollar of
foregone tax revenue. The estimated
saving effect is 40 c~.ts per $1 1~
effects are even larger when the marginal
contribution ($4.31 increase in the
private capital stock) or 60 cents ($12.01increase in the private capital
stock),
However, this calculation omits a @tentially ~rtant effect: The
increased supply of lc~~tile funk provided by I- will likely be used by
21Ne\vPrivate Saving perDollar of Revenue bss
o 10 19 26 40 60
Cents Cenk Cents Cents Cents Cents
Baseline SO.22 $0.81 $1.51 $2.21 $4.31 $12.01




Current t~~ 0.04 0.63 1.35 2.09 4.45 15.51
rates and
portfolio share
Table 1: Change in Net Capital Accumulation Per Dollar Incrcnse in
Government Revenue Lost on Individual Retirement Accounts
Sozirce: Authors’ calculations.co~rations for increased investment, which in turn will generate income and
co~rate tax payments. Feldstein’s (1995)analogous calculations to measure
the dyntic revenue loss of the IRA program include this co~rate tax effect.
We include the effect of co~rate taxation in our model by assting that only
e~ity investments are subject to the 34 percent mrginal co~rate tax rate
used in Feldstein (1995) . Because combined (co~rate plus individual) tax
revenue losses are roller in this scenario, the predicted -act on private
capital acmulation of one dollar in tax revenue is $4.84 at the benchmark
saving effect of 26 cents per dollar of IRA contribution. For sufficiently
high contributions to new savings, the 1~ becomes self–financing; as
Feldstein notes, it can actually generate revenue
The tax regime has changed substantially since
row of Tabie 1 repeats the calculation using more
these scenarios, we assume a marginal tax rate of
rather than losing revenue.
the mid-1980s. The third
current tax parameters. In
28 percent for contrtiutors,
a 24 percent mrginal tax rate at retiraent, no exclusion for capital gains,
and an average 26 percent tax rate on dividends and interest. To reflect the
increasing aggregate share of equities in IW (EBRI, 1994), we also assume
that plan assets are divided equally between stocks and tinds. The estimated
incraental @act is quite similar ($2.09)to the pre–1986 tax rules for our
assmed mi~int esttite of 26 cents of new saving.
To smarize, IW need not stimulate very substantial amounts of new
saving per lost dollar of revenue to generate favorable marginal increases in
tie capital stock per dollar of initial revenue loss. The intuition is that
even if the aggregate effects of a given 1~ program are not large -– in terms
22of overall increases in net saving -- the revaue costs can be even smaller,
especially once the offsetting effects of higher coprate taxes are taken
into account.
Similarly, est-ting the effectiveness of 401(k) plans depends on how
they affect capital acmulation per dollar of foregone revenue. However,
since there are fewer estimates of how 401(k)s affect saving behavior,
developing a benchmark estimate is mre difficult. Gn the one hand, if
401(k)s did not crowd out any other types of saving, the incremental private
capital accumulation per dollar of revenue cost would be $94, which is likely
to pass nearly any threshold of effectiveness.l~ If sorting or reshuffling
accounts for fully half of tie observed increase in wealth acmulation, the
401(k) program still generates a net increase of $3.60 in private saving Per
dollar of revenue cost.
AWelfm-Th~~tic ~mch b Satings In=ti=
Suppse for the sake of arwent that by rtisin~ t=es by $1.00 and using
the revenue to expand the 1~ program, private saving would rise by $2.21. (B\/
raising taxes and then distributing that mney as




the first row of Table 1.) This increase in
a t= break, no public
plan is on private savings,
the capital stock is not
from heaven; rather, it is the consequence of households consuming less
in anticipation of consuming additional resources in the future (at
retiraent) . my fund “Mough distortionary taxes a program which
househol& away from their presently favored level of cons~tion
23
shifts
to one thatfavors retir~~t cons~tion to a greater extent? TO offer an economic
justification for the existence of saving incentives, one must identify a
distortion that the saving incentives are designed to overcome. We consider
several pssibilities.~’
A figh Social Value of &pital Accumulation. To argue for substantial
external effects of increased capital acaulation, one must appeal to models
in whiti capital or invesdent yield psitive external effects on productivity
or output, as in the models of Romer (1986)or King and Rebelo (1990).
Others have noted the close correlation between saving and inveshent rates,~’
and between inveshent rates and Solow residual measures of productivity
growth (see Schultze, 1992, page 242). Hence the notion that a larger capital
stock yields social external &nefits is certainly a valid one, but it is
difficult to quantify. me problem with this rationale is that current saving
incentives are not well-suited to this purpose. They include restrictions on
contributions and the forced withdawal of assets at older ages, med.ani.m
not designed to entice the wealthiest households -- those who accoun~ for the
bulk of the nation’s saving -- to save much more.
Reducing the Distortion Between Current and Retirement Cons~tion.
Standard life-cycle models predict that tie tax on interest income distorts
consumption at retirement years (see, for exarriple, Feldstein, 1978). Shiftir.g
one dollar of current cons~tion to the future at the gross return should
provide a first-order welfare gain approximated by the wedge between the gross
and net return. However, the IRA and 401(k) program is a leaky bucket in
24effecting this transfer from ~rent to retiraent cons~tion since to the
extent revenue is lost because of partial shuffling.
We use this intuition to consider the ex~le in the section tive, using
the baseline parameter ass~tions and a marginal saving effects of 26 cents
per dollar of IW contribution. First, we assme that cons~tion in the year
of the 1~ contribution, say 1996, declines by 26 cents per dollar of 1~
contribution. Based on our calculations of the returns to this IRA,
cons~tion at the end of the 22-year holding period, in 2020 rises by 94.5
cents after all taxes are paid.lg By tie first-order conditions, the
individual is just indifferent to consuming 26 cents today, or putting that 26
cents in the bank to acmulate at the taxable rate of return, yielding 70.2
cents in the future period. The private individual gain from the the IR4 is
an extra 24.3 cents in the year 2020 (the 94.5 cent benefit less the
(accumulated)foregone cost of consuming today, equal to 70.2).
While the indiviauai is better off, the government loses revenue. The t=
loss, acmulated up to the year 2020, is 55.6 cents per dollar of
contribution. Raising tiat revenue is likely itself to entail a dea~eight
cost, whiti Ballard e~ al. (1985)calculate to be *ut 30 cents per dollar cf
revenue. Hence the total resource cost of funding the 1~ program under Lhese
assumptions is 55.6 x 1.3, or 72.3 cents, which exceeds the benefit to the
individual of 24.3 cents; hence the saving incentive would fail tie cost
benefit test judged solely on reducing tax distortions.
A larger saving effect would, of couse, make the 1~ a more efficient
means of encouraging saving. The breakeven @int for justifying the 1~
25program on the basis of reducing intertqral distortions is approximately 46
cents of new saving per dollar of contribution. When tie co-rate t= wedge
is included in these calculations, however, the 1~ program attains the
breakeven pint at about our ben-rk estimate of 26 cents.
Keeping the Elderly Off Welfare Prcgrarias. Welfare progrm such as
Supplemental Security Insuance (SS1)and Medicaid are designed to assist
elderly witi ltited assets and income. Encouraging households to contribute
money into I- and 401(k)s could save the govement mney in tie long–tern
by reducing the chance that individualswould qualify for means-tested welfare
programs (see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995). It is difficult, however,
to place a value of the incremental reduction in future government
expenditures because households participate in I- or 401(k)s today. Mother
problem with this explanation for saving incentives is that the programs are
typically voluntary rather than mandatory. Those most likely to end up on
welfare at retirement are probably also those least likely to contribute to
any new pension or saving program.
~opia and Self-Control. We have thus far restricted our attention to
individuals facing well–defined, dynamically consistent utility fur,ctions. %
Befieim (1996) e~hasizes, some available evidence indicates tiat people
stumble tiough their planning for retiraent with little idea of what they
require at retiraent and, perhaps, little mtivation to meet those
requiraents. For ex~le, Bernheim (1994a)suggests that saving rates on
average are only one–third what they should be for households to consume
during retirement at levels commensuratewith their pre-retiraent cons~tion
26patterns. If households made dyntically inconsistent plans (in the sense
of bibson, 1994; or Posnerr 1995), there my be an intrinsic value to
retiraent saving programs that assist in self control. In this case,
encouraging people to save helps to offset an “individual failure” or time–
inconsistency in planning for the future, which could well yield substantial
individual and social benefits.
The difficulty or inability of many individuals to save enough for tieir
retirement may well be the most persuasive justification for encouraging
saving incentives. mile intuitive, such benefits are difficult to quantify.
If one cannot describe preferences in a dynamically consistent way, it is
harder still to attach dollar-e~ivalent values to the shift in the allocation
of cons~tion. A noted hve, one problem witi viewing IP..As and 401(k)
plans as a way to encourage self control is that such programs are voluntary,
so that the people who have the mst trouble saving for retirement my be tie
ones least likely to enroll.
ticlusions






mre relevant in assessing the desirability of a permanent targeted saving
incentives by focusing prtirily on short–tern effects of i~ ~nd
programs. We find that, even under conservative assurriptions hut tie
to which contributions to saving incentives represent new saving,
incentives generate substantial net capital ac~ulation over ti~Le per
of foregone tax revenue. However, the long-term effects are arguabiy
27program. Life-cycle simulation exercises that attqt to quantify the
magnitude of IRA and 401(k) progrm on the long-tern capital stock perfomeci
in Engen and Gale (1993)and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994)esttite very high
benefit-cost ratios of increasedprivate capital stock per dollar of lost
revenue (or, in their case, per dollar of increased government debt) –– five
dollars of increased capital stock per dollar of tax revenue loss associated
with expanding 1~ contribution limits, and $17 of expanded capital stock per
dollar of tax revenue loss associated with expanded 401(k)s. The resources
are careful to qualify these long–ternpredictions, noting for example that
the period of transition is ~ite lengthy, taking nearly 50 years (after a
short–term decline in net capital accumulation) before these benefits are
realized.a Nevertheless, their exercise qhasizes the @rtance of
focusing on tie long–term steady–state @act of these saving progrm, which
might be quite different from their short–term or transitory effects.
Given mre than a decade of data on the @act of targeted saving
incentives on saving behavior, it is somewhat s~rising that economists still
tisagree on the fundamental question of whether such incentives work. me
reason why disagreements r-in is that economists are just beginning to
realize how little is understood hut cons~tion and saving behavior, and in
particular tiut the wide variation in saving behavior among people who are of
sfilar age, education, and income. As research on saving incentives provide
a better picture of their effectiveness at influencing saving behavior, we
hope and qect that it will develop a better picture of why households save.
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35Endnotes
1. See also Bernheim (1996) and Hubbard and Skinner (1995).
2. The Gale and Scholz (1994)measure of non-IRA wealth also
includes the cash value of life insurance, and includes
households with heads age 68 and younger.
3. For models along these lines, see, for example, Hubbard and
Judd (1987); Engen and Gale (1993); Engen, Gale, and Scholz
(1994); and Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994, 1995).
4. The presence of annual limits may in fact induce individuals
to begin saving in IRAs earlier to allow them to make larger
lifetime contributions.
5. Another way to see that IRAs tend to provide marginal
incentives in the long term is the insight from Feldstein and
Feenberg (1983) , that, given the low levels of household holdings
of financial assets, it would not take long for most households
to exhaust their ability to contribute if contributions were
drawn exclusively from existing (taxable) assets.
6. Of course, this result does not prove that the $2,000
contribution represents new saving; it could have been shuffled
saving. In a pure life-cycle model, however, taxpayers should
not need the prodding of a check due to the IRS to shuffle their
saving; they should have done it anyway.
7.One criticism of this “behavioral” approach is that self-
-control should be a problem among the relatively affluent group
of IRA contributors (Gale, 1995) . However, a recent focus group
conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, and limited to households
with net income of more than $250,000 or net worth in excess of
$600,000, found frequent mention of “the need to put money ‘out of
reach’ to avoid the temptation to spend it” (Kennickell, Starr-
McCluer, and Sunden, 1996, p. 7) .
8. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) and Bernheim (1996) argue
they are biased downward. Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) argue
that they are biased upward, in part by assuming IRA contributors
over 65, excluded from the Joines and Manegold analysis, shuffle
all their contributions from existing saving.
9. Our own suspicion is that the saving effect is somewhat
larger.
10. Another possible bias pointed out by Engen, Gale, and Scholz
(1996) is that the 401(k) balances are pre-tax, in that they
36reflect the tax break but not the future tax liabilities. A bias
may result from using changes in 401(k) balances to infer
something about individual saving.
I
11. This point was first made by Leslie Papke. See the other
papers in this symposium for a discussion of these issues.
12. This is why it is quite possible for Gale and Scholz (1994)
to estimate a negative coefficient of IRAs on saving if, for
example the individual shuffled taxable saving into the IRA, and
spent the tax break as well. Joines and Manegold (1995) were
careful to net out the tax break before arriving at their
estimates.
13. Assuming the contributor plans to smooth withdrawals between
age 65 and 80, age 72 is a midpoint.
14. Because of the higher return on stocks, the share of stocks
in the portfolio rises over the life of the IRA.
15. See Feldstein (1995). For example, if the government funds
an IRA program using deficit financing at 4 percent, and the IRA
is invested in equity paying 12 percent, the government could
make money on an IRA program when it taxes the appreciated return
on the IRA, even if the IRA is funded entirely out of existing
taxable saving.
16. The marginal tax rate at retirement is assumed to be 24
percent; the assumed equity share is 50 percent; and the average
tax rate on interest, dividends, and capital gains is 26 percent.
17. See Lazear (1994) and Bernheim (1994c) for a detailed
discussion of whether there are social benefits of higher saving
rates and a larger capital stock.
18. Hassett and Hubbard (1996) review empirical evidence which
suggests that the U.S. capital stock is below its golden rule
level. For this conclusion to suggest the need for saving
incentives, one would need to argue that increases in domestic
saving fund domestic investment.
19. Details available from the authors.
20. See Hubbard and Skinner (1995) for a detailed discussion of
these simulation estimates.
37